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ABSTRACT
Safe Village Initiative: A Quasi-Experiment,
Evaluating The Impact In 
West Las Vegas
By
Timothy D. Radtke
Dr. William H. Sousa, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justiee 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Beginning in January of 2007, the “Safe Village Initiative” (SVl) was 
implemented in West Las Vegas in response to firearm violenee. SVI represents an effort 
of eombined resourees from eriminal justiee ageneies, soeial serviee organizations, loeal 
elergy, and citizens to disrupt the cycle of violence that eharaeterizes fatal and non-fatal 
shootings. The SVl is essentially a deterrence based model aimed to reduce firearm 
offenses.
The current study will analyze SVI from two research questions. The research 
questions are designed to: 1) assess the qualities of SVI that make it unique from 
previously implemented “pulling levers” models, and 2) assess the impact it has had on 
West Las Vegas. Secondary data were received from Las Vegas Metropolitan Poliee 
Department and University Medical Center Trauma Unit as a means for assessment. 
Seeondary data were supplemented with qualitative interviews with founders and eore 
team leaders of SVl.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Murder, assault, stabbings, and drive-by shootings are all components of violence 
that disrupt the social cohesiveness of society. Many of these components can be found 
in communities that are host to gun/gang involved youth. Gangs, and the aspects of the 
violence they attract, draw young people from all walks of life, socio-economic 
backgrounds, races and ethnic groups. Gang involved youth violence is a problem not 
only for police but also for the community. Gang violence can destroy lives and rip apart 
the fabric of communities.
Without police to enforce laws and regulations, these components that make up 
the dreaded side of society would run rampant throughout the streets, creating a state of 
anarchy, causing social isolations of the desirable citizens. Police agencies have 
undergone numerous renovations to improve their resources in achieving an environment 
that is crime free. Police departments have continuously reengineered their tactics and 
strategies to improve community comfort, perception of “quality of life,” and the overall 
reduction in the fear of crime and crime rates. Police agencies have continued to be the 
leading force in crime fighting and maintaining order at the city, county, state, and 
federal level.
A core component of the criminal justice system is the implementation of a 
deterrence approach. The Thames River Police were the first acting police force, instilled
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to protect the London wharves from thieves for the West India Trading Companies. In 
1829, Sir Robert Peel of the London Metropolitan Police Department established the 
force with the intent to promote a preventive role in deterring urban disorder and criminal 
intent. Peel designed the police force to instill awareness in the community that police 
are there to maintain order and keep the peace (Gash 1961). At its essence the Peel 
model of policing has deterrence as its core element.
Models of deterrence have been implemented and practiced at all levels to reduce 
the amount of criminal activities. In the deterrent model, if a potential offender believes 
that the pleasure from committing a criminal offense is greater then the perceived 
punishment given for the offense, the offender will proceed with the criminal act. 
Assuming that the criminal is acting on a rational frame of mind, the police are trying to 
create an environment in which the criminal becomes acutely aware that the criminal 
sanctions for the crime outweighs the pleasure of committing a criminal offense (Akers 
1994). Police agencies are continually revamping their strategies to offset the potential 
criminal’s frame of mind.
Deterrence can either be specific or general. Specific deterrence is aimed at 
punishing criminals to discourage them from committing future criminal acts by instilling 
an understanding of the consequences (i.e. jail). General deterrence is the exploitation of 
specific deviants to arouse the public’s knowledge of consequence for the deviant 
behaviors (Akers 1994). General deterrence does not focus on individuals but rather 
projects the received punishment for criminal offenses in the public view in order to deter 
other individuals from deviant types of behavior in the future.
Experiments and evaluations of tactics used within police departments have aided 
in the advancement of the police field. The revamping of police strategies have come in 
response to fundamental social and technological changes in U.S. society. Officers first 
relied on foot patrol as a means to deter crime. However, proven to be expensive, highly 
corrupt, and the advancement of technology; foot patrol eventually became an uncommon 
tactic. Vehicle patrol became the symbol of American policing in the mid 1900’s. The 
uses of automobiles lead to a greater police presence in the community and a more rapid 
response. The Kansas City Police Department Preventive Patrol experiment resulted in 
contradictory findings to the concept that greater police presence produces greater 
reduction in crime (Kansas City Missouri Police Department 1977).
On February 2007, one such deterrent model has been implemented in southern 
Nevada’s Clark County. With the given name “Safe Village,” the initiative is designed in 
response to the firearm violence in West Las Vegas. The Safe Village Initiative is a 
result of both experimental and empirical evidence that supports the findings that gun 
violence is clustered among high-risk individuals, in high-risk places, at high-risk times. 
The initiative is a collaboration of agencies designed to disrupt the cycle of violence that 
characterizes both fatal and non-fatal shootings.
The collaborating agencies are composed from different sources of the 
community including; criminal justice agencies, social service, clergy partnerships, and 
the community. The main objective is to mobilize the community in an effort to rid the 
environment of gun/gang youth violence that has stricken the historical West Las Vegas 
community. Safe Village Initiative relies on information developed through community 
interaction and the implementation of operations designed for a specific purpose.
The “Safe Village Initiative” is concentrated in a small primarily residential 
community of minority, working class families located in “West Las Vegas” (Bolden 
Area Command). “West Las Vegas” accounts for a high majority of violent crimes that 
occur in the Las Vegas valley.
Safe Village is designed around the more notable Operation Ceasefires models 
implemented in Boston (MA), Richmond (VA), Los Angeles (CA), and Chicago (IL).
The Operation Ceasefires previously implemented has received public notoriety for their 
reduction in gun/gang involved youth and violent acts.
The purpose of this study is to analyze and assess the “Safe Village” initiative of 
“West Las Vegas.” An analysis will be conducted on the rates of calls-for-service 
provided by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and hospital patients 
admitted to the University Medical Center’s Trauma Unit for gunshot and stabbing 
wounds one year prior (January 1, 2006 through January 31, 2007) to the implementation 
of “Safe Village,” through a period of one year following the implementation (February 
1, 2007 through January 31, 2007). Along with the analysis of the crime and hospital 
data, qualitative interviews will compare the objective and design of the “Safe Village” to 
other Operation Ceasefire designs.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the late 1700s, thieves scoured the London ports for profitable gains through 
theft of cargo. The West India Trading Company established the Thames River Police 
force in 1798 with the sole objectives to prevent and detect thefts along the London 
wharves (Critchley 1967). Under control of magistrate John Harriot and Patrick 
Colquhoun, the Thames River Police force, even though met with hostile resistance, was 
considered a success (Critchley 1967). The successes lead to the conversion from a 
private to a public police force. The Thames River Police became known as the first 
police force to be established and lead to the establishment of police forces around the 
world.
Encompassing the Thames River Police model, in 1829 Sir Robert Peel, 
established the London Metropolitan Police Department as a means to promote a 
preventive role in deterring urban disorder and criminal intent in the greater London area. 
Peel designed the police force to instill awareness in the community that police are there 
to maintain order and keep the peace (Gash 1961). In its true essence, deterrence is a 
core element of the Peel model.
Deterrence models continue to be practiced in policing agencies as a means to 
reduce criminal activities. Agencies revamp their strategies to offset potential criminal’s 
frame of mind. According to deterrence theory, if a potential offender believes that the
pleasure from committing a criminal offense is greater than the perceived punishment 
given for the offense, the offender will proceed with the criminal act. Assuming the 
criminal is acting in a rational frame of mind, the police try to create an environment in 
which the criminal becomes acutely aware that the criminal sanctions for the crime 
outweighs the pleasure of committing the offense (Sherman et al. 1997).
Deterrence was defined in the mid 1700s by ancient philosopher Beccaria 
(Bellamy 1995).
“It is necessary to protect repository from private usurpations of each 
individual, who is always seeking to extract from the repository not only 
his own due but also the portions which are owing to others. What were 
wanted were sufficiently tangible motives to prevent the despotic spirit of 
every man from resubmerging society’s laws into the ancient chaos. Not 
even the most sublime truths have been enough to hold back for long the 
passions aroused by the immediate impact made by objects which are 
close at hand. The foundation of the sovereign’s right to punish crime: the 
necessity of defending the repository of the public well being from the 
usurpation of individuals” (Bellamy 1995, 9).
Beccaria believe that it was the right of the sovereign’s to punisht those that 
commit criminal offenses. “In order that punishment should not be an act of violence 
perpetrated by one or may upon a private citizen, it is essential that it should be public, 
speedy, and necessary, the minimum possible in the given circumstance, proportionate to 
the crime, and determined by the law” (Bellamy 1995, 113). Deterrence should pose 
enough of a threat to stop the most vindictive of criminals; “A lightning strike is needed 
to stop a fierce lion that is provoked by a gunshot” (Ballemy 1995, 113).
Deterrence can be understood in two separate aspects: specific or general 
(Sherman 1993). Specific deterrence is explained by the fact that pain generated by 
punishment will serve to discourage future criminality in an individual (MacKenzie 
1997). “It assumes a rational choice model of decision making, where the offender
perceives that the cost and benefits of punishment are not outweighed by the crime” 
(MacKenzie 1997, 13). Specific deterrence denotes the preventive effects of punishment 
on people who have been caught. Individual offenders arrested for an offense are less 
likely to repeat that offense in the future than offenders who are not arrested.
Furthermore, individuals who spend time in prison may be deterred from continuing their 
criminal activities when they are released (a specific deterrence effect).
General deterrence refers to the impact of threatened punishment on other 
potential offenders, thus reducing the chance that the public will commit crimes 
(MacKenzie 1997). General deterrence can be defined as the imposition of sanctions on 
one person in order to demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a 
criminal act, and thereby discouraging criminal behavior (Nagin 1978). General 
deterrence is an indirect experience with punishment that deters either through 
observation or otherwise having knowledge of the punishment of others. General 
deterrence refers to prevention of crimes by people in the community generally regardless 
of whether they have been caught and punished for a crime.
Policing
The course of policing in the United States has shown many diverse tactics 
implemented as a means to deter criminals. The reformation of police strategies have 
come in response to fundamental social and technological changes in U.S. society. The 
police culture has advanced through generations of different styles of policing to achieve 
their maximum potential. There have been eight major hypotheses about how the police 
can prevent crime: increasing the number of police officers on the street, rapid response
to 911 calls, random patrols, directed patrols, reactive arrests, proactive arrests, 
community policing, and problem oriented policing (Sherman 1997).
Increase Number of Police Officers 
The idea of putting more police on the streets is very popular with the public 
(Walker 2006). The idea that police patrol deters crime has been the bedrock principle of 
policing since Robert Peel in 1829 (Walker 2006). The central notion is that the more 
police patrolling, the less crime there will be. Officers more readily available and placed 
in constant view should deter “would be criminals.” As the level of violence throughout 
the 19th century declined, the number of police increased, and many observers concluded 
more police equals less crime (Gurr et al. 1977).
One of the largest and most expensive crime-fighting programs in recent history 
has been the federal Community-Oriented Policing Service (COPS) program, which 
spent over 7 billion since 1994 to put more officers on the street. A total of 83,024 
additional police officers were placed on the street as a result of the COPS program 
(Walker 2006)
Rapid Response to 911 
Theorists believed that the shorter police response time from dispatch to arrival at 
a crime scene, the more likely police can arrest offenders before they flee. Rapid response 
would be able to produce three crime prevention effects (Sherman 1997). First, it could 
reduce the harm from crimes by quicker police intervention. Secondly, rapid response 
time is a greater deterrent effect from the threat of punishment reinforced by response- 
related arrests. Thirdly, is the preservation of evidence used to prosecute the offender 
(Sherman 1997).
An assumption of the times was that rapid response to calls would produce more 
arrests, more witnesses, fewer injured citizens, and a higher degree of citizen satisfaction. 
In an effort to attain quicker response times, police officials increased the number of 
sworn persormel, purchased faster cars, and expanded large amounts of money to 
sophisticated communications systems and other technological innovations (Kansas City 
Missouri Police Department 1977).
The Kansas City Rapid Response Time Analysis concluded that achieving crime 
prevention merely by adding more police or shortening response time across the board 
was a failure. Of the collected 949 eligible calls analyzed, the researchers discovered; 
reporting the crime took up 48.1 percent of the total time, dispatch represented 21 
percent, and travel was 30.9 percent (Kansas City Missouri Police Department 1977). 
Rapid response relies strongly on the time taken to report the event.
Random Patrol
During the reform era many scholars, especially O. W. Wilson theorized that if 
police drove conspicuously marked cars randomly through city streets and gave special 
attention to certain “hazards,” a feeling of police “omnipresence” would be developed 
(Kelling and Moore 1988, 7). The increasing emphasis on rapid 911 responses in 
automobiles gradually allowed officers to patrol at random far beyond their assigned 
beats. This policy was justified by the theory that unpredictability in patrol patterns 
would create a perceived "omnipresence" of the police that deters crime in public places 
(Sherman 1997).
The Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department conducted an experiment designed 
to measure the impact routine patrol had on incidences of crime and the public’s fear of
crime. The Kansas City Police Department divided up 15 districts of the South Patrol 
Division into three separate beats: proactive, reactive, and control. “The essential finding 
of the preventive patrol experiment is that decreasing or increasing routine preventive 
patrol within the range tested had no effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community 
attitudes toward the police on the delivery of police service, police response time, or 
traffic accidents” (Kelling et al. 1974, 14).
Directed Patrol
With the introduction of computers into the policing function, computerized crime 
analysis created a precision in identifying crime patterns. Police have used that precision 
to focus patrol resources on the times and places with the highest risks of serious crime. 
The National Institute of Justice funded research has shown that the risk of crime is 
extremely localized, even within high crime neighborhoods, and varying widely from one 
address to another (Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs 1988; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger 1989). 
Goldstein once pointed to Boston where sixty percent of calls for service orientated from 
ten percent o f the households (Goldstein 1979).
“Hot spot” analysis suggests that a small number of locations in any particular 
city account for an abundance of crime and disorder problems. The hypothesis is that 
greater patrol presence concentrated at "hot spots" and "hot times" of criminal activity 
will reduce crime in those places and times (Sherman 1997).
Reactive Patrol
Reactive arrests (in response to specific citizen complaints) are similar to random 
patrol in that they cast a wide net by warning all citizens that they can be arrested for all
10
law violations at all times. The more arrests police make in response to reported or 
observed offenses of any kind, the less crime there will be (Sherman 1997).
Citizens are now authorized to make “citizen arrests.” When a non-swom citizen 
views a felony and/or an offense deemed arrest-able is able, he or she to place the 
individual in custody till the police authority is present. This creates an environment in 
which communities and individuals a like can aid the police in crimes reduction.
Advocates argue that more arrests will produce less crime. Proponents of reactive 
arrest theorize that arrest, especially for minor offenses, provokes a response by offenders 
making them more likely to commit future crime than if they had not been arrested 
(Sherman 1997).
Proactive Patrol
Proactive (police-initiated) arrests concentrate police resources on a narrow set of 
high-risk targets. The hypothesis is that a high certainty of arrest for a narrowly defined 
set of offenses or offenders will accomplish more than low arrest certainty for a broad 
range of targets (Sherman 1997).
A version of proactive arrest is "zero tolerance policing," based on the "broken 
windows" theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Implemented in New York Police 
Department during the Bratton administration, administrators theorized that areas 
appearing disorderly and out-of-control provide an attractive climate for violent crime 
just as a window with one broken pane attracts more stones than a completely unbroken 
window (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The crime prevention hypothesis is that the more 
arrests police make for even petty disorder, the less serious crime there will be (Skogan 
1990).
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Community Policing 
In the late 1980s Community Policing hypothesized that increasing the quantity 
and quality of police-citizen contact reduces crime (Kelling and Moore 1988). Police 
departments would be able to obtain vital information about erimes and criminals from 
officer’s direct communication with the public. With information obtained by patrol 
officers, investigative units and others would be able to significantly increase their effort 
in solving crimes (Kelling and Moore 1988).
The police have combined with the community to implement new and effective 
ways to reduce crime and protect neighborhoods. An example of a community policing 
program is "block watch," which increases surveillanee of residential neighborhoods by 
residents themselves, which should deter crime because offenders know the 
neighborhoods are under eonstant watch. Many community meetings and informal 
eontacts with police through storefront offices, foot patrol and other methods increases 
the flow of intelligence from eitizens to poliee about offenses and offenders, which then 
increases the probability of arrest for crime and the deterrent effects of arrest (Sherman et 
al. 1993; Trojanowicz 1986).
Problem Oriented Policing 
In 1979 Herman Goldstein’s originally formulated problem-oriented policing. 
Goldstein argued that: “police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral 
problems that arise in the community” (Goldstein 1979, 242). The concept of this style 
of policing is that police can make a greater difference by addressing core components of 
problems, rather then just responding to eaeh individual incident. Problem-oriented 
policing, when appropriately focused on specific crime problems, has been found to be
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effective in preventing crime (Sherman and Eck 2002; Weisburd and Eck 2004; Skogan 
and Frydl 2004).
In order for the police to be more efficient and effeetive, they must gather 
information about ineidents and design an appropriate response based on the nature of the 
underlying eonditions that eause the problem(s) (Goldstein 1990). “The central thrust of 
problem-oriented policing is to make the police more thoughtful about the problems they 
address and their methods of intervention. Problem-oriented polieing seeks to formalize 
a methodology for the police to address persistent eommunity crime, disorder, and fear of 
problems” (Greene 2000, 315).
A frequently used model of problem-orientated policing is “SARA” (Scan, 
Analyze, Respond, and Assess). “Using SARA, departments are to scan communities for 
problems, analyze the dynamies of these problems in a thorough and systematic way, 
design a response to address the defined and analyzed problem, then assess the impaet of 
the response on the identified problem” (Greene 2000, 315). The more aeeurately poliee 
ean identify and minimize proximate eauses of speeifie patterns of crime, the less crime 
there will be (Sherman 1997). A major problem-solving theory of erime prevention is to 
keep the more basie elements of eriminal events from combining: the more poliee ean 
reduee the interseetion of motivated offenders in time and spaee with suitable targets of 
crime, the less opportunity there will be to commit crime (Sherman 1995).
Pulling Levers
“Pulling levers” model eombines eommunity polieing with problem orientated 
police. The “pulling levers” model provides a broader, more eomprehensive eombination
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of strategies than most traditional problem-oriented policing programs (Weisburd and 
Braga 2006). “Pulling levers” strategies seem to be promising in controlling the violent 
behavior of groups of chronic offenders (Braga et al. 2001 ; Wellford et al. 2005;
Kennedy 2006).
“Pulling levers” is a two-part intervention. One part is a direct law enforcement 
attack on a specific target. The other part is an inter-agency working group deterring 
violent behavior by reaching out directly to the target audience, setting clear standards for 
behavior, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when 
those standards are violated. “The deceptively simple operation that resulted, made use 
of a wide variety of traditional criminal justice tools but assembled them in 
fundamentally new and different ways” (Kennedy 1998, 3).
The “pulling levers” model first requires that a target behavior be identified. To 
address that targeted behavior several agencies collaborate and with their resources 
capability, work as a group to address the behavior. There is a delivery of a “retail 
message” designed to deter possible violators. This message is communicated directly to 
the target audience and the audience is warned of possible consequences that will be 
brought down on them if they carry out the target behavior. This process is continued 
and the strategy is continuously being evaluated to achieve full potential.
The “pulling levers” strategy has been implemented on the east coast to attack 
such problems as gang violence and firearm involved violent acts. The most notable 
“pulling levers” initiative was implemented in Boston’s as “Operation Ceasefire.” It has 
continued on to be implemented in Richmond, Virginia’s “Project Exile,” as well as
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Chicago’s and Los Angeles “Operation Ceasefire” and now Las Vegas, Nevada’s “Safe 
Village Initiative.”
Boston. MA
During the latter part of the 1980s into the early 1990s the United States was 
experiencing an epidemic of youth homicide. From 1987 to 1990, Boston’s youth 
homicide increased from 22 to 73 a year and remained constant at 44 from 1991 to 1995 
(Braga et al. 2000). Research of the Boston area showed that much of the violence was 
concentrated in a relatively small number of chronically offending gang involved youths 
(Braga et al. 2000). Gang members in Boston are composed of less then 1 percent of the 
youth aged 24 and under (Braga et al. 2000). These gangs however, are responsible for at 
least 60 percent of the youth homicide in the Boston city area (Braga et al. 2000).
Boston initiated a problem solving project aimed to stop the gang violence by 
eradicating all illegal firearms and violent crimes off the streets. The project assessed the 
nature and dynamics driving youth violence. From that research a larger working group 
was assembled of federal, state, and local agencies. “The hope was that a successful 
intervention to reduce gang violence in the short term would have a disproportionate, 
sustainable impact in the long term” (Braga et al. 2000, 7).
The agencies that carried forth the project were the Boston Police Department, 
Massachusetts Department of Probation and Parole, Office of the Suffolk County District 
Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Boston School Police, and gang 
outreach and prevention “street workers” attached to the Boston Community Centers 
program (Braga et al. 2001).
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With all agencies directed at attacking the gang violence, “Operation Ceasefire” 
was created. “Operation Ceasefire includes two main components: a direct law 
enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns and an 
attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence” (Braga et al. 2000, 4). The steps 
that were initiated are as followed (Braga et al. 2001):
• Expanding the focus of the local, state, and federal authorities to include intrastate 
trafficking in Massachusetts-sourced guns, in addition to interstate trafficking;
• Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those makes and calibers of guns 
most used by gang members;
• Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of those guns showing short time- 
to-crime, and thus most likely to have been trafficked. The Boston Field Division 
of ATF set up an in-house tracking system that flagged guns whose traces showed 
an 18-month or shorter time-to-crime;
• Focusing enforcement attention on traffickers of guns used by the city’s most 
violent gangs;
• Attempting restoration of obliterated serial numbers, and subsequent trafficking 
investigations based on those restorations;
• Supporting these enforcement priorities through analysis of crime gun traces 
generated by the Boston Police Department’s comprehensive tracing of crime 
guns, and by developing leads through systematic debriefing of, especially, 
arrestees involved with gangs and/or involved in violent crime.
The second element of attempting to deter gang violence was initiated by
delivering a message that violence would no longer be tolerated. Ceasefire operatives
delivered the message to gang members through probation and police contacts, juvenile
facilities, and outreach workers. Ceasefire agencies use other gangs to cite examples of
the following sanctions that would occur if violence did ensue with gang activity (Braga
et al. 2000).
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The planning, researching, and meeting of Operation Ceasefire began in January 
of 1995, and street level operations began in 1996. The first official crack down and 
meeting with gang members of Operation Ceasefire was completed on May 15, 1996 
(Braga et al. 2000). The height of the operation occurred through 1996 and 1997.
Results became apparent in 1996 when Boston’s youth (24 and under) homicide 
rate had declined from 44 in 1995 to 26 in 1996 and decreased further to 15 in 1997 
(Braga et al. 2000). The Boston Police Department kept monthly counts of youth 
homicides between the months of January 1, 1991 through May 31, 1998. Monthly 
counts of citywide “shots fired” and citywide gun assault incidents were also recorded 
(January 1, 1991, through December 31, 1997) to calculate the interventions effect on 
non-fatal shootings (Braga et al. 2000).
Boston’s B-2 District is host to 29 of the 61 gangs in city limits. District B-2 was 
host to a third of the volume of homicides during the peak years of 1991 to 1995 (Braga 
et al 2000). Boston’s B-2 District gun assault incidents were recorded from January 1, 
1991, through December 31, 1997 to assess the effect of the intervention on the specific 
age group, 24 and under.
With May 15, 1996 declared as the first date of direct communication with gang 
members and Operation Ceasefire fully implemented, June 1, 1996 was selected as the 
start date for the “post” period. A time series showed a 63 percent reduction in the mean 
monthly number of youth homicide victims from pre-test mean of 3.5 per month to a 
post-test mean of 1.3 per month (Braga et al. 2000). There was a 32 percent decrease in 
the monthly number of citywide shots fired calls, a 25 percent decrease in the monthly
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number of citywide gun assault incidents, and a 44 percent decrease in the monthly 
number of District B-2 youth (24 and under) gun assault incidents (Braga et al. 2000).
Richmond, VA
South of Boston, Richmond, Virginia was finding resolution for their homicide 
problem. During the 1990s Richmond, Virginia, was plagued with being one of the top 
five cities in the United States with the worst per capita murder rates. Guns had become 
an all too familiar weapon of choice for crimes committed. In 1997, 140 people were 
murdered, 122 with firearms. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Attorney’s Office concluded the 
level of violence reached epic proportions and needed to be dealt with swiftly and 
severely (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999).
The U.S. Attorney's Office in Richmond developed and carried out an aggressive, 
innovative, and creative approach called "Project Exile.” Project Exile proposed all 
felons possessing guns or offenders carrying out offenses with firearms would be 
federally prosecuted (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 
1999). The U.S. Attorney’s office worked in coordination with federal (FBI, BATE), 
state, and local police agencies and local prosecutors. All agencies were to work in 
coordination to promptly arrest, incarcerate, detain without bond, prosecute and sentence 
the armed criminal. The U.S. Attorney's Office has also carried out a training program 
for the Richmond Police Department officers on federal firearms statutes and search and 
seizure issues (United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999). 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office also worked in coordination with “local government and 
business to launch a media campaign to communicate the message that illegal possession 
or illegal use of a gun would result in severe federal sanctions” (McGarrell 2005, 2). The
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media campaign was able to energize the community and increase citizen reports of guns 
(McGarrell 2005).
Under the control of federal prosecution the cases preceded through the courts 
systems in days rather then months. “Through these efforts, 287 armed criminals have 
been removed from Richmond's streets, one violent gang responsible for many murders 
has been destroyed, and the rate of gun carrying by criminals has been cut nearly in half’ 
(United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia 1999).
Los Angeles, CA
For decades Los Angeles has attempted to hinder the gang problem that has 
stricken their communities but have repeatedly not produced favorable results. Los 
Angeles accepted Boston’s Operation Ceasefire as a possible model. However, Los 
Angeles gangs are different from east coast gangs in that they tend to be bigger, more 
entrenched, and Latino (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
Los Angeles implemented Boston’s design. Like Boston, Los Angeles set a 
manageable and measurable objective, focusing on the specific problem of gun violence. 
Researchers served as conveners/ facilitators, analyzing crime data and other information. 
Criminal justice agencies, communities, and faith-based organizations identified the 
locale where an intervention would have a likely impact, and they decided what to do 
with the results of the researcher’s analyses (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
Los Angeles adopted a menu of “sticks” and “carrots.” Sticks were a range of 
sanctions or “levers” used to convince gang members to desist from violence by holding 
all of them accountable for violence committed by any one of them (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2005). The levers would be pulled or activated in response to a serious crime (a
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trigger event). In advance of lever-pulling, a message would be retailed; communicating 
with gang members the consequences that would result from gun violence but also the 
social services and alternatives to violence available to them (U.S. Department of Justice 
2005). Carrots are the prevention component of alternative services, a measure of the 
community’s determination to intervene early in the lives of at-risk youths.
The Boyle Heights neighborhood of the Hollenbeck section of Los Angeles was 
selected, chiefly because of its high crime rate. Among the 18 policing areas in the city, 
Hollenbeck has consistently ranked near the top in violent crime (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2005). The most intense gang rivalries are played out in the Boyle Heights 
neighborhood of Hollenbeck (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
Hollenbeck provided a solid infrastructure of community organizations, including 
faith-based institutions whose missions included reducing youth violence and gangs. A 
number of the community based organizations offer a variety of services to young people 
who want to break from their gang ties.
A trigger event occurred on October 8 , 2000. Several members of the Cuatro 
Flats gang, armed with handguns and at least one high-powered semiautomatic assault 
weapon, climbed out of a van and opened fire on a group of rival TMC (The Mob Crew) 
gang members. One TMC member was killed, along with a 10-year-old girl who was 
riding her scooter nearby (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) quickly allocated additional 
resources, stepping up patrol in the five police reporting districts of Boyle Heights in and 
aiound the homicide site. Officers from several special units were deployed, and each 
weekend for 2  months after the shooting, mounted police patrolled the parks and adjacent
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public housing developments in the targeted area. The County Housing Authority police 
stepped up patrol in a housing complex that was a hotbed of Cuatro Flats activity. Police 
and probation officers visited the homes of several well-known Cuatro Flats members, 
arresting three who had outstanding warrants or probation violations. At each visit, the 
officers made clear that their actions were a direct result of the violence committed by the 
gangs. Over the next 3 months, they arrested or revoked the parole of five more gang 
members, seized illegal guns, and referred several gun cases to the U.S. Attorney for 
prosecution (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
The operation did not fully materialize, however, because a few days before the 
double homicide, community representatives urged the policing component of the 
intervention be put into effect immediately, even before any triggering event and before 
services were ready. Their reasoning was the neighborhood perceived violence to be 
escalating rapidly in the area (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).
In Boyle Heights, where retailing was carried out and some increased social 
services were offered, all three types of crimes; violent, gang, and gun—declined (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2005). Intensive law enforcement took place in the five police 
reporting districts of Boyle Heights where Cuatro Flats and TMC were most active. In 
these districts, violent crime fell 37 percent overall, compared with 24 percent in the rest 
of Boyle Heights. Gang crime also fell during tlie suppression phase, although it began 
to rise during the deterrence phase. Gun crime, however, did not decline more steeply in 
the five districts than in the rest of Boyle Heights; it fell at almost the same rate (by about 
one-third) as where there was no law enforcement intervention (U.S. Department of 
Justice 2005).
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The policing (i.e., lever pulling) components of the intervention showed more 
promising effects than the retailing components, most notably in the measurable 
reductions in crime. Criminal justice system partners, especially LAPD and probation 
officers, were able to design a powerful policing element, in part because of the resources 
available to them and the flexibility they had in using them (U.S. Department of Justice 
2005).
Chicago, IL
In 1995 the city of Chicago initiated its own form of “Operation Ceasefire” 
designed around violence prevention. The mission of the Chicago Project for Violence 
Prevention has to work with community and government partners to reduce violence in 
all forms and to help design interventions to be included in a community or city anti­
violence program. The approach relied heavily on community outreach to work with 
youth at high risk of being involved in violence (University of Illinois at Chicago: School 
of Public Health 2007).
Chicago’s Ceasefire included community-based organizations to develop and 
implement strategies to reduce and prevent violence, particularly shootings and killings 
(University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007). Ceasefire relies on 
outreach workers, violence interrupters, faith leaders, and other community leaders to 
intervene in conflicts (or potential conflicts) and promote alternatives to violence. The 
resources to spread a strong public education campaign instilled the message that 
shootings and violence are not acceptable.
“Operation Ceasefire” was organized into five core components that address both 
the community and those individuals who are most at risk of involvement in a shooting or
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killing. The five components include community mobilization, outreach, faith leader 
involvement, public education and police participation (University of Illinois at Chicago: 
School of Public Health 2007).
Community mobilization focuses on residents, local businesses, service 
organizations, and members of the faith community to build a safer and more viable 
community. The purpose of community mobilization is to build and energize abase of 
support for Ceasefire that involves a variety of efforts to both stop shootings and killings 
in the near term and to change the underlying conditions that give rise to shootings and 
killings in the long term (University of Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 
2007).
Ceasefire outreach and high-risk conflict mediation are, together, perhaps the 
most vital of the five core components of Ceasefire. The outreach workers and violence 
interrupters are streetwise individuals who are familiar with gang life in the communities 
where Ceasefire is active. Many of them are former gang members and many have spent 
time in prison. These individuals identify with the street life mentality and engage with 
the most at-risk youth who are susceptible of becoming involved in violence in order to 
prevent shootings and killings from occuning. The outreach workers are to build 
sufficient trust with the at-risk youth and be able to influence the way they think, act, and 
redirect their motives into more positive pursuits (University of Illinois at Chicago: 
School of Public Health 2007).
Ceasefire engages members of the faith community to perform activities that 
complement those of the outreach workers. These faith leaders open safe havens, counsel 
high-risk individuals, participate and provide leadership in shooting responses, preach
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nonviolence, and urge congregants to work to stop shootings and killings (University of 
Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).
Ceasefire builds on the partnerships that many communities already have with 
police and fosters relationships with community residents in neighborhoods where those 
relationships may have been strained in the past.
The public education campaign is designed to facilitate behavior change and 
promote nonviolence. Neighborhoods are saturated with posters, leaflets, flyers, yard 
signs, bumper stickers, T-shirts, buttons and other materials that discourage violence and 
carry pointed messages about the consequences of shootings and killings (University of 
Illinois at Chicago: School of Public Health 2007).
Since the first implementation of a Ceasefire zone in Chicago (Beat 1115 in 
2 0 0 0 ), there has been a reduction in shootings of 6 8  percent in the first year, which has 
continued to an 82 percent reduction from 1999-2006. There was an average 63 percent 
decline in shootings across all sites from the time of implementation to the end of 2006.
In 2004, killings in Chicago decreased by 25 percent, while killings in Ceasefire zones 
went down by 49 percent.
Las Vegas, NV
The purpose of this study is to analyze the “Safe Village Initiative (SVI)” 
implemented by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in conjunction with the 
community. The Safe Village area is concentrated in a small, primarily residential 
community of minority, working class residents. The area of “West Las Vegas” accounts 
for a high majority of violent crimes that occur in the Las Vegas valley. The initiative is 
a collaboration of agencies designed to disrupt the cycle of violence that characterizes
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both fatal and non-fatal shootings. The collaborating agencies are composed from 
different sources of the community including: criminal justice agencies, social service, 
clergy partnerships, university (University of Nevada, Las Vegas), and the community.
Prior to the implementation of SVI, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department along with social service agencies had a functioning model in tact to 
mobilize the community. There was a prevention team designed to address the 
community through knowledge and events. The prevention aspect implemented their 
own initiative called I.C.A.N. (Initiating Community Action in Neighborhoods).
Through hosted events the members of the community could come out, socialize, and 
meet with clubs, while receiving literature on ways to “stop the violence.”
Along with the prevention aspect there was an intervention team which was 
composed of former gang members, with known reputations, going door to door speaking 
with children and families on reasons to avoid “gang life.” The intervention aspect was 
known as “Operation Lasting Peace.”
The model was not receiving beneficial results. In 2005 the community of “West 
Las Vegas” was home to a rash of shootings committed by both gang and non-gang 
individuals. The Gang Task Force Stakeholders decided to scrap much of the old model 
and revamp the initiative which later was converted to “Safe Village.” Stakeholders 
removed the initiative from addressing the entire valley and concentrated at a lower level, 
addressing locations that were in dire need of intervention (hot spots).
The Safe Village Initiative is composed of four core teams: Response, Outreach, 
Trauma, and Sustainment. Each team has a or is directed by a leader that has vast 
knowledge or close ties to the area.
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Response is directed by a former gang member turned pastor. The goal of the 
response teams is to demonstrate the outrage regarding violent events that are oceurring. 
The response team operates in reaction to a trigger event. When a violent act occurs 
(shooting, stabbing) they must initiate a response within 72 hours of the act. The goal is 
to show a bond between the action and reaction. Large groups of community members 
and the SVI operatives gather at the site of the violent event and disburse anti-violenee 
literature (at least 300 pieces of literature). When not in a response event the goal is to 
change the norms through mass media and door-to-door contact with citizens of the 
community.
The outreach team is guided by a gang specialist of Clark County. The objective 
of the outreach team is to provide a positive adult (mentor) in a gang/gun involved 
youth’s life. The mentor must be an individual from the community that has a gang 
reputation and has changed for the better. The core element of the outreach is the 
foundation of “trust,” in which the mentor establishes a strong relationship based on 
consistent follow-up. A positive result for the outreach component would be that the 
youth has no more arrests or involvement with the police, increases school attendance, 
and improves their grades in school. A desired outcome from the outreach team would 
be that probation and justice agencies will save money because of less recidivism; 
therefore fewer services will be needed.
The trauma aspects act as a bridge for intervention. The mentor is introduced at 
this point. The mentor is allowed into the hospital and visits the home to counsel the 
victim and family to de-escalate the situation. Once a patient is discharged from the 
hospital, the trauma team refers services for the patient. The goal of the trauma team is to
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make a positive change in the individual, stop any retaliation, and to train that individual 
in non-violent behavior.
Sustainment is the portion of the initiative that is designed to promote general 
program functioning. It is overviewed by a city employee in the Neighborhood Planning 
division. The sustainment goal is keep the funding available for longevity and create a 
point of entry for each individual initiative conducted, along with community 
mobilization.
The central hypothesis within the SVI is that by intervention at critical times in a 
victim’s life and showing community intolerance for violence, efforts would serve as a 
firebreak and result in a long lasting reduction of future violence. By creating that bond 
between community outrage and violence acts, a deterrent message will be delivered and 
possibly halt violence from continuously occurring in West Las Vegas.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH QUESTION AND DATA ANALYSIS
The area of “West Las Vegas” is located on the border of Las Vegas and North 
Las Vegas in the central portion of the valley. Although it is geographically smaller than 
many other residential communities in Clark County, it accounts for a high amount of 
violent crimes. In the year prior to the start of SVI, there were 283 illegal shootings and 
139 assault/batteries with a gun reported to LVMPD from West Las Vegas. These 
statistics prompted stakeholders within the community and LVMPD to direct an initiative 
to stop the violence, thus creating the SVI.
Due to the study’s concentration only on the SVI target area, secondary data were 
supplemented with qualitative interviews. A triangulation method of research was 
implemented as a means to uncover the full impact of SVI implementation. The analysis 
of the impact within West Las Vegas associated with SVI follows a basic one-group time 
series design. The analysis departs from a desirable, randomized controlled experimental 
approach.
Secondary data were received from University Medical Center Trauma Unit 
(UMC-Trauma Unit) and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD). The 
data were derived from these two sources to encompass the full spectrum of violent acts 
occurring in the targeted area. Each source individually does not receive the full volume 
of violence occurring in the target area. This may be because participants that are injured
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in the course of a violent act may refuse medical care but file a police report, or contrarily 
may receive medical treatment without notifying the police of the cause of injury. For 
example, victims receiving a wound(s) via a gun shot are more likely to receive medical 
care than a victim from a stabbing. Witnesses and/or participants are reluctant to report a 
crime to police for fear of involvement and/or retaliation.
A limitation to the use of secondary data as a primary source of data is that it is 
not recorded in a means for analysis. Many of the variables need to be recoded in a 
format that allows statistical analysis. By recoding variables, a researcher has the 
possibility of missing data; therefore caution must be used when deriving at a conclusion.
Qualitative interviews were conducted with fundamental developers and core 
team leaders of SVI. As stated in chapter 2, SVI is composed of four core teams; trauma, 
response, outreach, and sustainment. Interviewees were questioned on their specific area 
of concentration, goal, and their role within SVI. Interviewers also questioned the core 
team leaders about their expectations of the initiative, satisfaction, and any problems that 
they encountered while implementing SVI. The use of in-depth interviews offers the 
opportunity to uncover the underlying structure and complexity of the program from first 
hand experience (Babbie 2007). A weakness of relying on qualitative interviews for 
constructive purposes is that it is based on an individual’s perspective which may 
represent bias to their specific design and function of their core team.
The key outcomes in the assessment of SVI’s impact are the monthly number of 
gun and knife offenses responded to by LVMPD and the number of patients receiving 
care at the UMC-Trauma Unity for gunshot and stab wounds. SVi mainly targets 
violence arising from gang dynamics which is the primary source of violence in the West
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Las Vegas area. Therefore, the impact evaluation focuses on all gun and stabbing related 
offenses.
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department provided calls-for-service data 
used in these analyses. Calls-for-service were compiled for the targeted area, which is 
concentrated in Bolden Area command; beat sectors William 5 (W5) and William 6  (W6 ) 
(see Appendix I and II). For evaluation purposes, data were collected containing the 
following four variables: year, month, beat (W5/W6), and call-for-service (413, 413a, 
415a, 420, 420z, 434).
Calls-for-service were selected due to the nature of the offense. Calls-for-service 
are used as a measure of the known gun and knife offenses being committed and 
reported. The following calls-for-service are defined as: 413- person with a gun, 413a- 
person with a knife, 415a- assault with a gun, 420- homicide, 420z- attempted homicide, 
and 434- illegal shooting.
University Medical Center- Trauma Unit 
Official data obtained from UMC-Trauma Unit contains the number of injured 
patients admitted to the trauma unit from the SVI target area (zip-code 89106), resulting 
from either a stabbing or a gun shot. UMC-Trauma Unit staff collected data on nine 
individual variables. The variables were collected from a patient’s “face-sheet” that is 
routine for all inpatient care to the trauma unit. The “face-sheet” is started once first 
contact is made with the patient, by paramedics or UMC staff. Information that is unable
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to be doeumented at initial eontaet is later provided by the family through further follow- 
up. The nine variables eolleeted are as follows: type of wound, raee, gender, day, month, 
year, length of stay in hospital, zip-eode of patient’s residenee, and disposition of hospital 
stay.
Zip-eode of resideney is a primary variable in the analysis due to the intense 
eoneentration in the targeted area. The West Las Vegas area is eneompassed in the 
89106 zip-code. The zip-eode is eolleeted as a means to determine if the patient is a 
resident of the targeted area or traveled into the targeted area. Names and address of 
resideney were not provided for eonfidentiality purposes. A weakness with the UMC 
data is that if the zip-eode is unable to be provided by the patient, UMC staff provides the 
zip-eode 89102 as the primary resideney zip-code, whieh is the zip-code for UMC. A 
limitation also occurs in UMC’s use of zip-eodes and LVMPD’s use of beat sectors as a 
means to record data. The problem that is encountered is that zip-code 89106 is larger 
than W5 and W6 . By this issue, patients that are from the 89106 zip-eode are aceounted 
for, yet they may not be from the target area of W5 and W6 .
A limitation to the use of UMC data is that it is being gathered by type of wound; 
however there is no distinguishing variable that states how the wound was reeeived. This 
ean result in wounds being eounted, but not reeeived from a violent aet. Therefore, 
caution must be used when interpreting the results.
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Research Question 1
How do the qualities o f SVI make it unique from previously implemented
“Pulling levers" models?
From the qualitative interviews a table was constructed of key variables needed to 
implement a problem-orientated policing “pulling levers” strategy. These variables 
assessed were: directed initiative, jurisdiction/working group, police enforcement, 
message, outreach, and community mobilization. These six variables were selected as 
key elements to the foundation of the strategy. Four cities: Boston (MA), Richmond 
(VA), Los Angeles (CA), and Chicago (IL), were selected because they previously 
implemented a “pulling levers” strategy. Their specific strategies were reviewed and 
compared to Las Vegas (NV) SVI.
Directed initiative was selected as the first variable because identifying a specific 
problem is a core element of problem-orientated policing that must be met prior to any 
further action. Each city identified a target behavior or offense to be addressed, such as 
gang violence.
Jurisdiction/working group was selected as a means to identify how resources 
were being dispersed through out the initiative and the array of agencies collaborated to 
address the “target behavior.” Jurisdiction was broken down into “city wide” or specific 
“sector beats.” “City wide” refers to addressing the problem wherever it occurred in the 
city. “Sector beats” refers the operation being conducted in a specific location, which 
primarily is police sector beats or community neighborhoods. The working group is an 
array of agencies collaborating from the area to address the directed initiative.
In this study “police enforcement” refers to the efforts of the police agencies. In 
problem-orientated policing, once a problem and core elements to that problem are
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identified, an attack is strategized. That core elements of the problem that is addressed 
through enforcement efforts is categorized in the variable.
In a “pulling levers” strategy, message delivery is a key component. Through 
direct and explicit methods delivered to a small target audience, the audience becomes 
aware of the initiative and the possible sanctions they may receive if they continue 
committing the targeted behavior. Message delivery may be done through police 
contacts, media outlets, or outreach workers.
The outreach variable refers to the use of individuals going into the community 
and preaching the message of non-violence. These individuals communicate directly 
with the target audience about the resources available and provide some guidance. Along 
with outreach workers, faith based leaders and community supporters may assist in 
reaching out to the target audience.
Community mobilization refers to engaging the citizens to get involved in the 
revitalization of the community and aid in the initiative. This can be accomplished 
through distribution of anti-violence literature, hosting events for knowledge of the 
initiative, or a response implemented after a violent act occurred. By involving the 
community in the initiative a sense of cohesiveness ean be restored to the community, 
which may result in benefits such as: aid in police investigation, less crime, and largely 
contributing to eradication of problem behaviors or groups.
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Research Question 2 
Were there significant reductions in violence after the implementation o f  SVI?
This question is addressed through the analysis of the secondary data. The 
secondary data was eolleeted to provide empirical support on SVTs effectiveness in 
“West Las Vegas.” A time-series design and mean comparisons were constructed for all 
calls-for-service. An “Independent Sample T-Test” was used to test the signifieanee in 
the data from ‘pre’ to ‘post’ implementation.
For these analyses, February 1, 2007 is selected as the first official date of SVI 
implementation, since all elements were established and in place. LVMPD provided data 
from February 1, 2006 through January 31, 2008 on counts of the previously mentioned 
six calls-for-serviee from W5 and W6  beat sectors. Calls-for-service data reeeived 
during February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were eolleeted as pre-implementation and 
data from February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.
Counts of patients receiving care for gun shot or stabbing wounds from the 89106 
zip-code were provided by UMC- Trauma Unit from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 
2008. The patients receiving treatment from January 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were 
compiled in pre-implementation and patients receiving treatment from February 1, 2007 
to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.
Hvpothesis
Stated formally the research question will address the following 10 hypotheses.
H]: The average number of ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the I year
period following SVI implementation will be less then the average number 
of ealls-for-serviee during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of calls-for-service in
W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI implementation
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when compared to the average number of ealls-for-serviee during the one
year period prior to SVI implementation.
H2 : The average number of 413 ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average 
number of 413 ealls-for-serviee during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 413 ealls-for-
serviee in W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 413 ealls-for- 
serviee during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
H3 : The average number of 413A ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average 
number of 413A ealls-for-serviee during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 413A ealls-for-
serviee in W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 413A ealls-for- 
serviee during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
H4 : The average number of 415A ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average 
number of 415A calls-for-serviee during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 415A ealls-for-
serviee in W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 415A calls-for- 
service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
H5 : The average number of 420 ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average 
number of 420 ealls-for-serviee during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 420 calls-for-
service in W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 420 calls-for- 
serviee during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
He: The average number of 420Z ealls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average
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number of 420Z calls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 420Z ealls-for-
serviee in W5 and W6  during the year 1 year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 420Z calls-for- 
service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
H?: The average number of 434 calls-for-serviee in W5 and W6  during the 1
year period following SVI implementation will be less then the average 
number of 434 ealls-for-service during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of 434 calls-for-
service in W5 and W6  during the year I year period following SVI 
implementation when compared to the average number of 434 ealls-for- 
serviee during the one year period prior to SVI implementation.
Hg: The average number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds
from zip-code 89106 during the I year period following SVI 
implementation will be less then the average number of patients admitted 
for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the 1 year period prior to SVI 
implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted
for gunshot and stabbing wounds from zip-eode 89106 during the year I 
year period following SVI implementation when compared to the average 
number of patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the 
one year period prior to SVI implementation.
Hg: The average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds from zip-
eode 89106 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will 
be less then the average number of patients admitted for gunshot wounds 
during the 1 year period prior to SVI implementation.
Ho: There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted
for gunshot wounds from zip-eode 89106 during the year 1 year period 
following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 
patients admitted for gunshot and stabbing wounds during the one year 
period prior to SVI implementation.
H iq: The average number of patients admitted for stabbing wounds from zip-
code 89106 during the 1 year period following SVI implementation will 
be less then the average number of patients admitted for stabbing wounds 
during the I year period prior to SVI implementation.
36
Hot There is no difference between the average number of patients admitted 
for gunshot wounds from zip-code 89106 during the year 1 year period 
following SVI implementation when compared to the average number of 
patients admitted for stabbing wounds during the one year period prior to 
SVI implementation.
Data collected from both sources were entered into a database (SPSS) for 
analysis. Data were analyzed to determine significance in the reduction of the mean 
monthly counts of calls-for-service and admitted patients for a year prior to the 
implementation of SVI to a year following at the .05 significance level.
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CHAPTER 4
KEY EVALUATIONS AND FINDINGS 
Research Question I
How do the qualities o f SVI make it unique from previously implemented “pulling levers”
models?
Problem-orientated polieing holds great promise for creating strong responses to 
crime, fear, and publie safety problems. The “pulling levers” strategy of problem- 
orientated police aspires to address problems and develop a strategic response by using a 
wide variety of resourees. By creating a model for problem identifieation and response 
development, police ageneies will be able to implement newer teehniques for addressing 
problems rather than resorting to previous traditional models.
Many major poliee ageneies have eollaborated with the community they serve to , 
address local problems. Since many other “pulling levers” models have been 
implemented, a comparison table was formulated to identify the framework of the 
strategy ineorporated. Boston (MA), Richmond (VA), Los Angeles (CA), Chieago (IL), 
and Las Vegas (NV) were selected due to the departments “pulling levers” model.
In Table 1, the first element of the “pulling levers” strategy is the identification of 
a localized problem. Each of the five operations identified a “targeted behavior” toward 
whieh the eity or a speeific community directed the initiative. Boston (MA) addressed
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the youth homicide epidemic that reached epic proportions in the mid 1990s. Richmond 
(VA) and Los Angeles (CA) each identified firearm violence committed by gangs or 
felons possessing firearms. Chicago (IL) and Las Vegas (NV) purposed their initiatives 
in response to violence in general, although primarily focusing on firearms violence.
In Table 1, the jurisdiction/working group section addresses how resources are 
allocated towards the targeted behavior. Boston (MA) and Richmond (VA) directed its 
efforts to the entire city because the aim was to do something about the target offense 
wherever it presented itself (Braga et al. 2000). Where as Los Angeles (CA), Chicago 
(IL), and Las Vegas (NV) designed their initiative around a targeted area with a high 
concentration of the targeted behavior. The use of police beat sectors allowed the police 
and community to better allocate the resources, rather than disperse them entirely through 
the city. The design of specific target areas allowed for a tighter community response 
and greater knowledge of the central problem in the area. In Las Vegas much of the 
firearm violence that was occurring in West Las Vegas was the result of gang mentality, 
where as that may not be the case in other areas
The collaboration of diverse agencies allowed for a multitude of resources made 
available that previously were not. Boston (MA) and Richmond (VA) primarily relied on 
agencies from the criminal justice system, which hindered their efforts in mobilizing the 
community. Los Angeles (CA), Chicago (IL), and Las Vegas (NV) designed there 
initiative around the capacity of a police enforcement and community effort. The three 
operations used resources available to the community and the surrounding environment 
to address the targeted behavior.
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The eentral idea of problem-oriented policing is gathering information about 
incidents and design an appropriate response based on the nature of the underlying 
conditions that cause the problem(s) (Goldstein, 1990). Boston (MA) aimed to stop the 
gang violence by eradicating all illegal firearms that were used in the eourse of homicides 
(Braga et al. 2000). Boston collaborated with multiple agencies and designed an 
initiative to disrupt intrastate trafficking of the makes and models most likely used in the 
commission of homicides. In Richmond (VA) the U.S. Attorney's Office performed a 
training program edueating the officers of the Richmond Police Departments on federal 
firearms statutes and seareh and seizure issues (United States Attorney Office for the 
Eastern Distriet of Virginia 1999). Los Angeles (CA) stepped up poliee and housing 
authority enforcement but only after a trigger event (gang shooting). Other than to 
response to a trigger event, enforeement efforts remained at eonstant patrol effort. 
Chicago (IL) did not implement a direct police enforcement effort. LVMPD established 
a “Safe Village Team,” in whieh officers communicate with the eitizens and business in 
the West Las Vegas eommunity. At first initiation of SVI, LVMPD invited citizens to 
identify “problem” homes of the target area. Intelligenee was gathered on homes, 
warrants were issued, and swat teams raided the premises for drugs and illegal firearms. 
LVMPD also established a “Safe Village Team,” in whieh officers communieate with the 
eitizens and business in the West Las Vegas community.
Delivering a message of “no tolerance” has become a key element of the “pulling 
levers” strategy. By implementing a message, the community becomes aware of the 
direet initiative on the offense and has the ability to aid in the efforts. Boston (MA) 
delivered the message that “violence is no longer tolerated” to gang members through
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probation and police contacts, juvenile facilities, and outreach workers. In Richmond 
(VA) the U.S. Attorney’s Office worked in coordination with “local government and 
business to launch a media campaign to communicate the message that illegal possession 
or illegal use of a gun would result in severe federal sanctions” (McGarrell 2005, 2). Los 
Angeles (CA) communicated their message as a means to let gang members know of the 
possible consequences that would result from gun violence, as well as the alternatives and 
social services resources (U.S. Department of Justice 2005). Chicago (IL) engage 
outreach workers, violence interrupters, faith leaders, and other community leaders to 
deliver the message; “shooting and violenee is not aeeeptable” (University of Illinois at 
Chicago: School of Public Health 2007). Las Vegas (NV) produced fliers, banners, 
media outlets, outreach workers, faith based leaders, and hosted eommunity events to 
spread the message; “stop the violenee.” In West Las Vegas, when an event is held or 
media is present, fliers are distributed along with banners being hung with the message.
Outreach workers are individuals willing to go out in the eommunity and speak 
directly with the target audience. They provide the target audienee with support and 
resources needed to promote a message of anti-violence. Chieago (IL) and Las Vegas 
(NV) involve individuals with previous criminal records that have redireeted their lives to 
help those at-risk. Faith based leaders are deployed as a means to spread the word 
through their parish. Los Angeles (CA) relied primarily on faith based leaders and 
business as a means to deliver the message. Boston (MA) used outreach workers assist in 
spreading the message.
Community mobilization is a key element in aiding the cause. By involving the 
eommunity, police will increase their ability to identify suspects and apprehend
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criminals. Revitalizing the community will increase the eommunity’s net worth and 
inerease the market value. Chieago and Las Vegas have implemented a response rally 
event around a violent aet. Onee a shooting or violent act occurs a response is initiated in 
whieh members of the initiative and the members of the eommunity eome to the site of 
the violent aet and demonstrate their outrage. This response gives the eommunity a voiee 
to preaeh that they are not going to stand for further acts of violence. With this response, 
members of the initiative aid in the restoration of the community by restoring historic 
buildings or teaching the ehildren that violence is not the answer.
Researeh Question 2 
Were there significant reductions in violence with the implementation o f SVl?
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
The Safe Village Initiative team was brought together for a meeting on January 
21, 2007, as a means to establish goals and form an effective strategy for complete 
implementation. In these analyses, February 1, 2007, was seleeted as the date of first 
implementation, since all elements of the strategy: policing, response, trauma, outreach, 
and sustainment were in place.
Appendix III is a representation of the spatial analysis (GIS) for all gun related 
offense (exeluding 413 A) for all LVMPD’s by beat seetors. Figure 1 of Appendix III is 
pre implementation SVL As the shade of the seetor beat increase in darkness the sector 
has a higher volume of firearms violence per square mile within that seetor. Accordingly, 
W5 and W6  are among the two darkest shaded beat seetors within LVMPD’s jurisdiction, 
thus revealing that W5 and W6  is host to a high concentration of firearm violence.
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Figure 2 of Appendix III is an illustration of the decrease experienced in the volume of 
firearm offense following a year after implementation of SVl. This illustration concludes 
that there was a decrease in the 5 firearm related calls-for-service per square mile within 
W5 and W6 . Along with the decrease in shade of the target area, surrounding beat 
sectors decreased as well, indicating to a possible spreading effect.
Figure 3 presents a time-series analysis of the monthly counts for W5 and W6  six 
calls-for-service during the study time period. The time-series shows a 37.04 percent 
reduction in the mean monthly number of the six calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 
56.7 calls-for-service per month to a post-test mean of 35.7 calls-for-service per month. 
This simple analysis suggests that SVl was associated with a large reduction in gun and 
knife related calls-for-service in West Las Vegas, and supports the first hypothesis (Hi).
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Figure 3. Time Series of All 6  Calls For Service
Figure 4 is a representation of W5 and W6  six calls-for-service for one year prior 
to implementation of SVl (February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007) to one year after direct
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implementation (February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008). With the exception of 
November (pre = 44, post = 45), the post intervention remained consistently below the 
pre SVl monthly counts of gun and knife related calls-for-service.
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Figure 4. Pre and Post SVl Comparison
Table 2 presents the results of the significance test when comparing means for pre 
and post SVl implementation for the six calls-for-service. Pre SVl is the mean counts of 
the six calls-for-service per month for one year prior to implementation. Post SVl is the 
mean counts for the six calls-for-service per month for one year following 
implementation. The t-test revealed a statistically significant difference between the pre 
SVl and post SVl calls-for-service (/ = 5.675,p  = .000). (Each individual call-for-service 
will be explained in further detail in the next section).
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Ta )le 2. Results from Time-Series Design T-test
Pre.SVI Mean Post.SVI Mean t P
All Calls-For-Service 56.67 35.67 5.675 . 0 0 0
413- Person with a Gun 16.08 1 1 . 0 0 3.984 . 0 0 1
413 A- Person with a Knife 4.50 4.42 .103 .919
415 A- Assault/battery with 
a Gun
11.58 6.67 4.287 . 0 0 0
420- Homicide 1.80 1.17 .850 .417
420Z- Attempted Homicide 1 . 0 0 1.33 -.775 .495
434- Illegal Shooting 23.58 12.67 4.914 . 0 0 0
Table 3. Six Calls-for-Service: Comparing pre-implementation to post-implementation
Feb06 - Jan07 Feb07 - Jan08 Percent
Change
Target Area (W5 and W6 ) 680 428 -37.06%
BAG (not including W5 and W6 ) 1,761 1,424 -19.14%
BAC (including W5 and W6 ) 2,441 1,852 -24.13%
LVMPD (not including W5 and W6 ) 12,095 10,950 -9.47%
LVMPD (including W5 and W6 ) 12,775 11,378 -10.94%
As previously stated West Las Vegas is primarily a small community with a high 
concentration of firearm violence. When accounting for the six calls-for-service analyzed 
in W5 and W6  there was a 37.06 percent reduction experienced from pre to post SVl (see 
Table 3). Bolden Area Command experienced a 19.14 percent reduction when not 
including W5 and W6 . When not including W5 and W6 , LVMPD as a department 
experienced a 9.47 percent reduction from pre to post SVL Illustrated in Table 5 gun and 
knife related offense were down through all of LVMPD jurisdiction.
When including W5 and W6  into Bolden Area Command the reduction was 
reduced from 19.14 percent to 24.13 percent. When including W5 and W6  with all other 
LVMPD jurisdictions, the reduction in gun and knife related offenses decreased from 
9.47 percent to 10.94 percent. Table 3 represents the effect the reduction in gun and
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knife related calls-for-service experienced in West Las Vegas had on Bolden Area 
Command and LVMPD as a department. Prior to SVl, West Las Vegas experienced a 
high volume gun and knife related offense that with the reduction experienced during 
SVl, all of LVMPD’s gun and knife related offense were affected.
413- Person with a Gun 
LVMPD represents a “person with a gun” with the code 413. The 413 call-for- 
service was selected due to the nature of weapon identified. Figure 5 presents a time- 
series of the monthly counts of 413 calls-for-service from one year prior to SVl 
implementation to one year following SVl implementation. The time series shows a 31.6 
percent decrease in the mean monthly counts of 413 calls-for-service from a pre-test 
mean of 16.08 per month to a post-test mean of 11 per month. Referencing Table 2, the 
t-test for 413 concluded that there is statistical significance (t= 3.984, p-.OOl), therefore 
rejecting the null hypothesis and finds support for H%.
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Figure 5. Time-Series of 413 Call-for-Service
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413A- Person with a Knife 
According to LVMPD’s codes, 413A is defined as a “person with a knife.”
Figure 6  presents a time-series of the monthly counts for 413A calls-for-service received 
by LVMPD from pre to post implementation. Table 2 illustrates the reduction in the 
average means from a pre SVl mean of 4.50 to a 4.42 post SVl mean. Table 2 shows the 
reduction in the means was not statically significant (t=.103,/7-.919), therefore failed to 
reject our third null hypothesis and providing no support for the third hypothesis (H3).
Call of Serive 413A, W6 and W6 
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Figure 6 . Time-Series of 413A Call-for-Service
415A- Assault/Batterv with a Gun 
The nature of a 415A is a direct offense targeted by SVl. Figure 7 represents a 
time-series of the mean monthly number of 415A calls-for-service for W5 and W6  with a 
pre-test mean of 11.6 to the post-test mean of 6.7. Reference to Table 2, the f-test for
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415 A is statically significant {t = A 2^1 ,p  = .000) leading to rejecting the hull hypothesis 
and finds supports for the fourth hypothesis (H4 ).
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Figure 7. Time-Series of 415A Call-for-Service
420- Homicide
Homicide is an offense that triggers a community response. Figure 8  represents 
the time-series for homicides. Homicides in the target area experienced a decrease in the 
mean from a pre SVl of 1.8 per month and post SVl of 1.2 per month. Table 2 revealed 
that the reduction in means was not statistically significant (t = .850,/? = .417), therefore 
failing to reject the fifth null hypothesis, that there is no support for H5 .
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Figure 8 . Time-series of 420 Call-for Service
420Z- Attempt Homicide 
LVMPD recognizes ‘420Z’ as an “attempted homicide.” The ‘Z’ is placed after 
the code to represent an “attempted offense.” The analysis produced a difference in the 
average number of “attempt homicides” occurring in W5 and W6  (pre mean = 1, post 
mean = 1.33). The /-test in Table 2 is representative of the change not being significant {t 
= -.115, p  = .495). At the .495 level, the drop in the average failed to reject our sixth null 
hypothesis, that there is no support for He.
However with 2 “attempt homicides” during the pre-test time period and 4 during 
the post-test time period. The increase may represent a positive. With an “attempt 
homicides” representing homicides not fully completed an interruption may have 
occurred resulting in fewer fatalities.
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Figure 9. Time-series of 420Z Call-for Service
434- Illegal Shooting 
Illegal shootings are a primary offense targeted in the initiative. A response is 
designed around a violent act which draws attention. With a response design strategy, the 
public can witness a link between an event like an “illegal shooting” and a community 
response to violence. “Illegal shootings” are a primary call-for-service in the analysis 
due to its frequency and possible outcomes of the offense.
The time-series (figure 10) represents the 46 percent reduction in the mean 
monthly number of 434 calls-for-service (pre mean = 23.6, post mean -  12.7). Table 2 
illustrates the reduction was statically significant {t~  ,9\A ,p = .000), leading to the 
rejection of the seventh null hypothesis and finding support for H?.
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Figure 10. Time-series of 434 Call-for Service
University Medical Center Data Analysis 
Data received from UMC-Trauma Unit was analyzed to assist in measuring the 
impact of SVl. The variables used assisted in identifying demographics of the 
individuals admitted and the severity of the shootings and stabbings occurring in the 
89106 zip-code. UMC-Trauma Unit provided data from February 1, 2006 to January 31, 
2008 on all admitted patients from the 89106 zip-code, receiving care for either a “gun 
shot wound” or a “stabbing.” For analysis purposes patients receiving care from 
February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2007 were collected as pre implementation and patients 
from February 1, 2007 to January 31, 2008 were collected as post-implementation.
A total o f 93 patients were admitted into UMC-Trauma Unit for wounds received 
from either a “gun shot” or “stabbing,” during both pre and post implementation years. 
Of these 93 patients, 60 (64 percent) were treated for “gun shot wounds” and 33 (35.5 
percent) received care for “stabbing” wounds.” During pre SVl there were a total count 
of 54 patients admitted and 39 during post SVL The monthly average of patients
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admitted during pre SVl implementation were 4.50 and 3.25 during post SVl 
implementation. Figure 11 presents the time-series with a mean comparison when 
accounting for both “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients.
Figure
UMC; Gun Shot and S tabings Combined 
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11. Time Series of Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit
Table 4 presents the results of the significance test when comparing means for pre 
and post SVl implementation of “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients. The f-test revealed 
that there was no statistically significant difference between the pre SVl and post SVl 
mean when accounting for both “gun shot” and “stabbings” wounds {t = 1.6 8 , p  = .107)'. 
With the p-value being greater then .05, the analysis fails to reject the eight null 
hypothesis, that there is no support for Hg.
' A lthough this result is not significant at the .05 level, there is support for Hg at the .10 level, since the 
research hypothesis is directional.
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Table 4. Results from Time-Series Design T-test Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds
Pre.SVI Mean Post.SVI Mean t P
Gun Shot and Stabbing Wounds 4.50 3.25 1 . 6 8 .107
Gun Shot 2.92 2.08 1.09 .283
Stabbing 1.58 1.17 .814 .424
To test the severity of the violence occurring in West Las Vegas an analysis was 
configured on “hospital disposition.” Figure 12 presents pre.SVl with post.SVI hospital 
disposition for both “gun shot” and “stabbing” patients. As the table presents majority of 
the patients admitted were released and returned home after treatment (pre.SVl = 44, 
81.5%, post.SVI = 37, 94.9%). During pre.SVl, 6  victims were fatally wounded as a 
result of their injuries (DOA = 3, Death = 3). While post.SVI only experienced 1 
deceased patient (DOA = 1, Death = 0).
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Figure 12. Counts of Patients Hospital Disposition
From the UMC-Trauma Unit data, analyses were configured on further 
demographics of the patients. Table 5 illustrates the central tendency for age of admitted
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patients. By conducting an analysis of the ages, one is able to acknowledge target 
audiences age. The average age of the patients admitted prior to SVl implementation was 
30.6 years (pre median = 28.5, pre mode = 19) and pre implementation an average age of 
29.8 (post median = 25, post mode = 19). Due to outliers in the age of patients admitted. 
Median and Mode are viewed as the more accurate measure of central tendency. A 
unique finding in the analysis is that younger individuals were admitted at a higher 
frequency for “gunshot” wounds, while elders were admitted more frequently for 
“stabbing” wounds.
Table 5. Central Tendency Test for Age of Admiltted UMC-Trauma Unit Patients
n Mean Median Mode sd Range
Pre.svi Gun Shot and Stabbing 54 30.6 28.5 19 12.57 59
Post. SVl Gun Shot and 
Stabbing
39 29.8 25 19 13.66 62
Pre.svi Gun Shot 35 26.6 23 19 11.53 45
Post.svi Gun Shot 25 24 2 1 16 12.55 62
Pre.svi Stabbing 19 38 40 32 11.32 49
Post.svi Stabbing 14 39.7 39.5 37 9.52 32
Males were the vast majority admitted (pre.svi = 85.2%, post.svi = 82.1%). When 
accounting for race African Americans were treated the most frequently (pre.svi = 62.9%, 
post.svi= 76.9%), followed by whites (pre.svi = 29.6%, post.svi = 15.4%), Hispanics 
(pre.svi -  5.6%, post.svi = 7.7%), and other races (post.svi -  1.9%, post.svi 0%).
Gun Shot Patients
From February 1, 2006 to January 31, 2008, there were an aggregate total of 60 
patients admitted to UMC-Trauma Unit for “gun shot” wounds. Of those 60 patients, 35 
(58.3 percent) were admitted patients during the pre-implementation time period (pre 
mean -  2.92 per month). In the year following implementation of SVl there were 25
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(41.7 percent) patients admitted (post mean = 2.08 per month). Figure 13 is a 
presentation of the time series analysis conducted on “gun shot” patients admitted into 
the UMC- Trauma unit. Table 4 presents the t-test gunshot patients revealing that the 
change was not statistically significant {t = \ .09,p = .283) thus failing to reject the ninth 
hypothesis, that is, there is no support for Hg.
UMC: G u n  S h o t  W o u n d s  fro m  89106  
F e b ru a ry  1, 2006  - J a n u a r y  31 , 2008
F e b -  M ar- A p r- M ay- J u n -  J u l-  A u g - S e p -  O c t-  N ov- D e c -  J a n -  F e b -  M ar- A pr- M ay- J u n -  J u l-  A u g - S e p -  O c t-  N ov- D e c -  J a n -  
0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 6  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 7  0 0
“ G u n  S h o t  W o u n d s  8 0 1 0 6  I
Figure 13. Time Series of Gun Shot Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit
Stabbing
The pre SVl data collection presented a total count of 19 stab wounds treated, an 
average of 1.58 per month. The post.SVl data presented a total count of 14 patients, 
averaging 1.38 per month. Referring back to table 4, the t-test showed no statistical 
significance, thus failing to reject the tenth null hypothesis, that is, there is no support for 
Hio-
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As discussed in chapter 3, one could reasonably agree that victims receiving a 
wound(s) via a gun shot are more likely to receive medical care than a victim of a 
stabbing. Therefore, the lower counts for stabbings are not surprising.
UMC: S tabb ings P atien ts from 89106 February 1, 2006 - January  31, 2008
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Figure 14. Time Series of Stab Wounds Treated at UMC-Trauma Unit
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION
The research presented shows that the Safe Village Initiative was a meaningful 
problem-orientated policing effort that brought the community and the practitioners 
together in new ways that lead to a fresh assessment and new operational activities to the 
violence occurring in “West Las Vegas.” This new and innovative strategy departed 
from the previous traditional practices that were less effective. SVl has been hailed by 
the founders and core team leaders as success. Even though the study can not declare 
with precision that the violence reduction in “West Las Vegas” was due to SVl, based on 
the timing and the direct intervention, one can reasonably conclude that SVl likely had a 
causal effect on the violence.
Presented in Table 1, SVl is the only model that fully incorporated resources from 
both the police and the community. The police carried out the criminal justice services 
needs when a violent act occurred and placed officers in the comrnunity as means to 
establish Intelligence on the community’s acceptance to the initiative. The community 
and the services provided have excited the citizens. Events and community restoration 
projects are being conducted as means to place pride back into the once violent 
community.
Since February 1, 2007, a substantial reduction in violence occurred in West Las 
Vegas. LVMPD responded to fewer calls-for-service which were firearm and knife
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related. There was an overall reduction of 37 percent in the six calls-for-service studied 
from one year prior to implementation to one year after. The year prior to SVl, LVMPD 
was responding to an average of 56.7 gun and knife related calls-for-service per month. 
One year following intervention, the average reduced to 35.7 gun and knife related calls- 
for-service per month.
Lach of the calls-for-service study produced results that were favorable to the 
implementation of SVl. Persons with a gun (413), persons with a knife (413 A), 
assault/battery with a gun (415 A), homicide (420), and illegal shooting (434) all were 
reduced in the course of a year post SVl implementation. Lven though “person with a 
knife” (413 A) and homicide (420) reductions in the monthly means were not determined 
to be statically significant the counts were still reduced. 420Z was the only call-for- 
service to not produce lower counts; however this can be viewed as a positive outcome. 
An increase in “attempted homicide” may be beneficially received in the direction that a 
homicide was not fully carried out. In the course of the act, an interruption occurred, 
which one can conclude that a life may have been saved.
Along with the LVMPD data showing favorable reduction in violent calls-for- 
service, the UMC-Trauma Unit data showed 38.9 percent reduction in admitted patients 
for “gun shot” and “stabbing” wounds from zip-code 89106 (West Las Vegas). Patients 
receiving care for a “gun shot” wound decreased 28.6 percent from pre SVl (35 patients) 
to post SVl (25 patients). “Stabbing” patients were down from a pre SVl count of 19 to a 
post SVl count of 14, a reduction of 26.3 percent.
A unique finding from the UMC data was that patients receiving care for a “gun 
shot” wound were older than expected with a mean age of 30 (pre.SVl = 30.6, post.SVl
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29.8). There was a distinguished difference between the ages of patient being treated for 
a “gun shot” wound, compared to those being treated for a “stabbing” wound. The mean 
age of the patients receiving care for a “gun shot” wound were 26.6 (pre.SVl) and 24 
(post.svi). Patients with a “stab” wound had a mean age of 38 (pre.SVI) and 39.7 
(post.svi). However, when assessing central tendency of age, the median and mode, 
appeared to be the greater measurements of accuracy. Outliers in the age skewed the 
means to produce a high average.
As with any study there are limitations. This study lacks in research from social 
service and community efforts. To fully incorporate the impact of SVl, research would 
need to include data from probation and parole, outreach programs, and demographics 
variables (school enrollment, clergy membership).
Conclusion
SVl was constructed largely of resources and capacities available in the 
community at the time and tailored to stopping the violence in “West Las Vegas.” SVl 
applies a basic principle of problem-oriented policing to a public safety problem in a 
specific location. Addressing this problem of violence required the involvement of 
multiple agencies and the community, as well as substantial investment in coordination 
and implementation. SVl has shown that deployment of services and community 
intervention can yield substantial benefits. The problem-orientated nature of the initiative 
involves the definitions of the problem, establishment of core participants, design of a 
particular strategy for intervention, and implementation through collaboration.
6 0
SVl was designed to be replicable for other cities and jurisdictions. SVl was 
customized to address the particular violence occurring in “West Las Vegas,” 
collaboration of agencies, and the capacities available in “West Las Vegas” for 
incorporation into a strategic intervention. Certain elements of SVl, such as a “working 
group,” and the use of qualitative and quantitative research to discover a chosen problem 
shall be applicable for other problem-solving efforts. By establishing a “working group,” 
criminal justice practitioners in other jurisdictions can develop a set of intervention 
strategies that are designed to fit their specific violence problem and their operational 
capacities. The initiative implemented in other communities may not closely resemble 
the tactics used in SVl; however the framework can be similar.
The “pulling levers” strategy at the heart of SVl was designed in to influence the 
behavior and the environment in West Las Vegas. SVl in it essences is a deterrence 
model gained through advertising the message and by designing a community response to 
a violent act. By initiating a community response a link is drawn between the violence 
and the community’s outrage. It is crucial that the target audience understand the new 
regime that the community is imposing.
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APPENDIX I
LVMPD JURISDICTION MAP
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APPENDIX II
LVMPD BOLDEN AREA COMMAND MAP
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APPENDIX III
GIS ANALYSIS MAPS
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Safe Village: Pre Implementation Results 
February 1, 2006 - January 31, 2007
h—
N
A
I Miles
■ 1
■...A
\
I . Firearm Violence Rate Per SqrMiie
0 1 2
<1 -2 5  
>25 - 50 
> 5 0 -1 0 0  
> 1 0 0 - 2 0 0  
>200 - 400 
400+
Figure 1. Pre Implementation GIS
Map Created on March 7, 2008 
by Timothy D. Radtke
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Safe Village: Post Implementation Results 
Febraury 1, 2007 - January 31, 2008
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